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SURVEY SECTION
Workers' Compensation Law. D. Corso Excavating, Inc. v. Pou-
lin, 747 A.2d 994 (R.I. 2000). Beneficiaries of legislated economic
benefits who do not enjoy a protected property interest, a vested
substantive entitlement or an enforceable contractual right to re-
ceive benefits from the state are not entitled to benefits once legis-
lation providing for such benefits is repealed. The repeal of a
workers' compensation reimbursement statute, allowing qualifying
employers and their insurers to obtain reimbursement from the
Second Injury Fund,' eliminates reimbursement benefits for those
whose claims were not yet accepted nor adjudged entitled to reim-
bursement when the repeal became effective.
FAcTs AND TRAVEL
Employee Louis Mosca, Sr. (Mosca) sustained an injury to his
left knee during the course of his employment with petitioner D.
Corso Excavating, Inc. (Corso) on May 26, 1989.2 Mosca had in-
jured his knee twice previously while working for different employ-
ers and had undergone three surgeries to the knee. 3 Corso knew of
Mosca's previous knee problems upon hiring him.4 Corso's work-
ers' compensation insurer, petitioner Liberty Mutual Insurance
Co. (Liberty), accepted liability for Mosca's disability through a
memorandum of agreement just one day after the injury was sus-
tained. 5 For ten years thereafter, Mosca received weekly workers'
compensation payments.6
It was not until August 1993 that the director of the Depart-
ment of Labor and Training (director) was notified by petitioners of
a potential section 28-37-47 reimbursement claim against the
state's Second Injury Fund arising from Liberty's disability pay-
ments to Mosca.8 On August 31, 1993, Liberty submitted its reim-
bursement claim. 9 On December 23, 1994, the director denied the
claim and petitioners filed suit in the workers' compensation court
1. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-37-4 (1956) (1998 repealed).
2. See D. Corso Excavating, Inc. v. Poulin, 747 A.2d 994 (R.I. 2000).
3. See id. at 997.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-37-4 (1956) (1998 repealed).
8. See D. Corso, 747 A.2d at 997.
9. See id.
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to obtain reimbursement.' 0 In 1996, the trial judge dismissed the
claim as untimely." After a panel of the appellate division af-
firmed that ruling, Corso and Liberty petitioned the Rhode Island
Supreme Court for certiorari. 12
While the supreme court petition was pending, the Rhode Is-
land General Assembly repealed section 28-37-4.13 Thereafter, the
supreme court issued a writ of certiorari to review the appellate
decision and to determine the effect of the repeal on petitioners'
reimbursement claim.
BACKGROUND
Under the reimbursement scheme provided by section 28-37-
4,14 certain second-injury payments by employers and/or their
workers' compensation insurers to previously disabled employees
were eligible for potential reimbursement. 15 The source for this
reimbursement was an administrative account, also known as the
Second Injury Fund, within the state's general fund.16 Section 28-
37-4 provided that an employer may qualify for reimbursement
from the special state fund if the employer could establish by writ-
ten records that he or she had knowledge of a preexisting disability
at the time that the employee was hired.' 7 The law additionally
provided that when an employee who was previously disabled by
any work-related cause aggravates this preexisting condition, the
current employer shall pay all compensation, but shall, subject to
qualification, be reimbursed from the special fund for any compen-
sation payments paid after the first twenty-six weeks of disabil-
ity.18 The legislative purpose of this second injury payment
system was to encourage the employment of disabled employees by
limiting employer liability for the high compensation and medical
charges associated with re-injury of a previous existing
condition. 19
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-37-4 (1956) (1998 repealed).
15. See id.
16. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-37-1 (1956) (2000 Reenactment).
17. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-37-4(d) (1956) (1998 repealed).
18. See id. at § 28-37-4(b).
19. See id. at § 28-37-4(a).
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With the 1998 legislative repeal of section 28-37-4,20 the
Rhode Island General Assembly expressly provided that second in-
jury reimbursement benefits would no longer be available and such
repeal would "apply to all claims for reimbursement against the
fund in which the director has not accepted liability nor has been
adjudged liable for reimbursement."2' The current case responds
to questions of the constitutionality of this legislation and of the
legislative intent by the repeal to have a retroactive effect on com-
pensation claimants not yet granted a secure right to payment but
who have relied on an expectancy of this right.
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court considered whether the
General Assembly intended its 1998 repeal of section 28-37-422 to
eliminate reimbursement benefits for those qualifying employers
who, prior to the repeal, had paid workers' compensation to previ-
ously disabled employees and had submitted claims, but whose
claims were not yet accepted nor adjudged entitled for reimburse-
ment when the repeal became effective. 23 The supreme court held
that the repeal had been intended to eliminate these claims. 24 The
court based its decision on prior case law requiring that retroactive
termination of an unsecured expectation such as reimbursement
can only be accomplished by clear evidence of legislative intent.25
After reviewing the plain language of the repealing legislation, the
court determined that the Legislature expressly terminated reim-
bursement funding to claimants whose claims were pending.26
The Legislature maintained one exception to this generalized de-
termination. The exception was that a claim may be exempt from
the reimbursement repeal if it entailed any preexisting agree-
ments, preliminary determinations, orders or decrees between the
director and any employer, employee or insurer under which the
director accepted liability or had been adjudged liable.27 Similarly,
20. See D. Corso, 747 A.2d at 998.
21. Id. at 998.
22. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-37-4 (1956) (1998 repealed).
23. See D. Corso, 747 A.2d at 997.
24. See id. at 998.
25. See id. at 999 (citing Dunbar v. Tammelleo, 673 A.2d 1063, 1068 (R.I.
1996)).
26. See id.
27. See id. at 998.
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any substantive rights were not to be affected by the repealing
legislation. 28
In light of this determination, the supreme court considered
whether a qualified employer or insurer, who paid compensation to
disabled employees in reliance on the presumed continued availa-
bility of section 28-37-1 reimbursement benefits has a claim that
has ripened into a substantive right.29 The court held that under
this circumstance, claimants possess mere "floating expectancies
or gratuities," but not substantive rights, which are immune to leg-
islative reimbursement repeal. 30 Consequently, petitioners in this
case possessed a mere expectancy that could be eliminated at any
time. 31 Following the determination in Dunbar v. Tammelleo,32 a
floating expectancy remains subject to legislative modification un-
til an award is made.33 The supreme court emphasized the danger
inherent in allowing mere expectations to be construed as terms of
an enforceable contract, a protected property interest, or a vested
substantive right.34 The court expressed deference to the funda-
mental power of the Legislature alone to modify and amend stat-
utes.35 Therefore, in this case, the submission of a claim for
statutory benefits, even when based upon actions performed before
the repeal and in reliance upon the presumed availability of such
benefits, has not immunized the claim from the effects of the legis-
lative repeal of reimbursement funds.36 The court affirmed the ap-
pellate division's decision to deny petitioner's claim, but for
reasons of the efficacy of the legislative repeal and not for reasons
of an untimely submitted claim.37
The Rhode Island Supreme Court placed emphasis on the
principle that mere enactment of a statutory benefit scheme does
not create protected property interests, substantive vested rights
or enforceable contractual obligations in benefit claimants, unless
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. (citing Dunbar, 673 A.2d at 1067).
31. See id.
32. See Dunbar, 673 A.2d at 1067.
33. See D. Corso, 747 A.2d at 998.
34. See id. (citing Retired Adjunct Professors v. Almond, 690 A.2d 1342, 1346
(R.I. 1997)).
35. See id.
36. See D. Corso, 747 A.2d at 1000.
37. See id. at 1002.
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the government has become liable for the claim.38 Liability would
attach upon a government agent's acceptance of liability or upon
adjudication of liability. 39 In this case, the director had not ac-
cepted the claim by the petitioners, nor had liability been judicially
mandated.40 The petitioners were deemed to have no property
rights in the reimbursement funds sought because the Second In-
jury Fund is strictly property of the state.41 Any annual assess-
ment fees paid into the fund by employers or insurers become
public monies, and the employees or insurers possess no direct or
vested interest in the fund.4 2 Consequently, the Fund does not
amount to a taking without just compensation in violation of the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, or in violation
of article 1, section 16, of the Rhode Island Constitution.43
Additionally, the court rejected the argument that reliance on
future benefits amounts to a unilateral contract, enforceable on the
theory of promissory estoppel. 44 The court deemed such notions as
applicable to private contractual contexts only, and ill suited for
public contract-rights analysis. 45 Also, no statutory language
demonstrated any legislative intent to enter into a contract with
employers or insurers to provide them with reimbursement bene-
fits, or to vest them with substantive rights immune to legislative
abrogation.48 In this case, petitioners' interest in reimbursement
was deemed a mere floating expectancy, distinct from a legally pro-
tected substantive right.4 7 The court hinted, however, that even if
a substantive right had been impaired by the repeal, as long as the
repeal was reasonable and appropriate for a legitimate public pur-
pose (such as preserving state fund assets), no contract impair-
ment claim would be viable.48
38. See id. at 1000.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 1001 (citing John J. Orr & Sons, Inc. v. Waite, 479 A.2d 721, 726
(R.I. 1984)).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See D. Corso, 747 A.2d at 1001 (citing Retired Adjunct Professors, 690 A.2d
at 1346).
45. See id.
46. See D. Corso, 747 A.2d at 1001.
47. See id.
48. See id. at 1002 (citing Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kan. Power & Light
Co., 459 U.S. 400 (1983)).
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Finally, the retroactive repeal of section 28-37-449 was held
not to violate petitioners' equal protection clause guarantees under
either article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution or under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 50
The supreme court looked to the reasonableness and appropriate-
ness of the repeal as a means of furthering the state's public pur-
pose of asset preservation. 51 Because this purpose was deemed to
further a legitimate state interest, the court gave deference to the
power and provisions of the statutory repeal.52 Consequently, the
court held that the Rhode Island General Assembly was entitled to
conclude that this strong state interest outweighed any floating ex-
pectancies that employers and insurers may have entertained to
obtain reimbursement under section 28-37-4. 53 The court rea-
soned that because the retroactive repeal of this statute was not
irrelevant to achieving the state's objective, the petitioners' equal
protection challenge was unavailing. 54
CONCLUSION
In D. Corso Excavating, Inc. v. Poulin, the Rhode Island Su-
preme Court clarified the General Assembly's intent in repealing
Rhode Island General Laws section 28-37-4 by holding that a claim
for workers' compensation reimbursement, initiated prior to statu-
tory repeal, may be retroactively denied when claimant had no
substantive, contract, or property rights established. A mere float-
ing expectation of future reimbursement by a state fund, and a re-
liance on such funds when paying workers' compensation for an
employee suffering a re-injury, creates no vested right to payment
when the statutory source of funds is repealed. A statutory benefit
scheme may be repealed by the Legislature if its purpose is in fur-
therance of a legitimate state interest, thereby eliminating retroac-
tively even those claims already pending prior to repeal. Absent a
state's acceptance of liability, or an adjudged liability, such retro-
active application is not violative of a claimant's constitutional
49. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-37-4 (1956) (1998 repealed).
50. See D. Corso, 747 A.2d at 1002.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See id.
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rights and cannot be the subject of a due process, just compensa-
tion or contract impairment challenge.
Christy Hetherington
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Workers' Compensation. Lombardo v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 746
A.2d 679 (R.I. 2000). The Rhode Island Supreme Court held that
the amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act regarding the
common law odd-lot doctrine both codified and modified the
doctrine.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Alfred Lombardo (Lombardo) was employed by Atkinson-Kie-
wit Construction Company.' In 1991, he injured his back in a fall
at work.2 He underwent surgery, but remained partially and per-
manently disabled.3 Lombardo began receiving total-disability
benefits on July 29, 1991. 4 The employer then petitioned to review
the award, feeling that Lombardo could return to light duty work.5
Later the parties entered into a consent decree, discontinuing the
total-disability benefits and awarding Lombardo partial-disability
benefits. 6 In February 1995, Lombardo filed a petition to review,
alleging that he was entitled to total-disability benefits based on
section 28-33-17(b)(2). 7 The parties agreed that Lombardo's al-
leged entitlement to total-disability benefits according to the odd-
lot doctrine was the sole issue before the court.8
The matter went to trial in March 1996.9 The trial judge
asked for memoranda from both sides stating their positions on
how the statute, particularly the subsection (section 28-33-
17(b)(2)), should be construed. 10 The judge ruled Lombardo was
entitled to receive total-disability benefits.1 The trial judge deter-
mined that the "1992 amendment did not create or establish a new
entitlement to benefits, but merely defined, in statutory form, the
criteria for application of the odd-lot doctrine." 12 The appellate di-
vision reversed the trial judge's decision. 13 The three-judge panel
1. See Lombardo v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 746 A.2d 679, 682 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 682-83.
8. See id. at 683.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. Id.
13. See id.
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ruled that the employee failed to prove "manifest injustice" as re-
quired by statute. 14
BACKGROUND
The original Workers' Compensation Act (WCA) provided that
if an employee sustained a compensable and work-related total
and permanent disability, the employer must pay the injured em-
ployee one-half his or her wages.15 The original WCA did not spe-
cifically address permanent but partially disabled employees who
were unable to obtain regular work.16 Instead, the court applied
the common law odd-lot doctrine to these partial but permanent
disability cases. 17 The common law doctrine basically provided
that a permanently, but partially, disabled employee was entitled
to recover total-disability benefits (as opposed to partial-disability
benefits) if he or she was unable to perform either his or her regu-
lar job, or any alternative employment.' 8 It was up to the em-
ployer to show that the worker could actually perform and obtain
an alternative job. 19
In 1992, the General Assembly amended the WCA. 20 The
amendment codified the odd-lot doctrine, but made a few revisions.
Basically, section 28-33-17(b)(2) states the odd-lot doctrine, but
adds the requirement that the employee would suffer "manifest in-
justice" if he or she did not receive total disability compensation
and shifts the burden of proof from the employer to the employee. 2 1
ANALYsIs AND HOLDING
The court found that the General Assembly intended to both
codify, and at the same time modify, the common law odd-lot doc-
trine.2 2 The court found that for an employee to qualify for bene-
fits under section 28-33-17(b)(2), the employee has to show he or
she is unable to perform his or her job and any alternative employ-
14. Id. at 683-84.
15. See id. at 681.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 681-82.
20. See id. at 682.
21. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-33-17(b)(2) (1956) (1992 Reenactment).
22. See Lombardo, 746 A.2d at 684.
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ment.23 This showing subsumes "manifest injustice."24 Thus, the
court holds that when a permanent but partially disabled em-
ployee shows he or she is unable to perform regular or alternate
work, the trial judge should find that "manifest injustice" would
otherwise result if total disability benefits are not awarded to such
employee.25
The court also found that because Lombardo affirmatively in-
voked the provisions of section 28-33-17(b)(2), he cannot argue that
portions of the statute (namely the "manifest injustice" and burden
of proof portions) do not apply to his case because his injury oc-
curred before the 1992 effective date of the WCA amendments. 26
The court ultimately held that the panel acted within in powers in
determining that Lombardo did not carry his burden of proof on
the manifest injustice issue. 27
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Goldberg dissented.28 She argued that, pursuant to
longstanding Rhode Island precedent, the court should have ap-
plied the law as it stood at the time of the injury.29 Justice
Goldberg also opined that Lombardo should have been estopped
from arguing the inapplicability of the statute simply because he
at one time affirmatively invoked the statute.30 She stated that "it
is obvious that the employee amended his petition for review and
abandoned his reliance on the statute or at the least, he signaled
his alternative reliance on the common-law doctrine."31
CONCLUSION
In Lombardo v. Atkinson-Kiewit, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court held that the amendment to the Workers' Compensation Act
found in section 28-33-17(b)(2) both codified and modified the com-
mon law odd-lot doctrine. The court held that the employee has
the burden of proving that because of his or her partial but perma-
23. See id. at 686.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 687.
26. See id. at 684.
27. See id. at 687.
28. See id. at 689.
29. See id. at 689-90.
30. See id. at 690.
31. Id. at 691.
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nent disability, the employee is unable to perform his or her regu-
lar job and any alternative employment. If the employee can prove
this, he or she has proved that "manifest injustice" will result if the
employee is not awarded total-disability benefits.
Tanya J. Zorabedian
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Workers' Compensation Law. Ponte v. Malina Co., 745 A.2d
127 (R.I. 2000). The workers' compensation statute governing ap-
peals from memorandum of agreements (MOA) is interpreted to
allow an employee to petition to amend the MOA without any limi-
tations period if the purpose of the petition is to include in the
MOA another part of the body that was injured at the same time as
the original injury. Based on such an amended MOA, any petition
by the workers' compensation claimant to obtain additional com-
pensation retroactive to the date of the MOA, or to some later date
if the MOA is still in effect, must be brought within a three-year
period. A claimant may only be awarded such benefits if the claim
or issue is not precluded because of res judicata or collateral estop-
pel and if the incapacity is proven by a fair preponderance of the
credible evidence. A petition for benefits based on a recurrence of
incapacity because of an injury included in an amended MOA, and
only applying to benefit payments from and including the date of
the alleged recurrence, must be filed within a ten-year period.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
This case originated when an employee of the Malina Com-
pany (employer), Estrela F. Ponte (employee), injured herself in
May 1986 while working as a machine operator.1 The original
MOA that employer filed with the Rhode Island Department of La-
bor and Training described employee's injury as a "sprain on left
shoulder."2 Employee later alleged that this description of her in-
jury was incomplete because it failed to mention the injury to her
neck that she also suffered when she injured her shoulder at
work.3 Nevertheless, employee initially failed to take any steps to
amend the MOA while she received workers' compensation bene-
fits based upon the original MOA.4 These benefits were termi-
nated on September 6, 1988, based upon the Workers'
Compensation Court trial judge's finding, pursuant to employer's
petition (WCC 1), that the employee's work-related left shoulder
injury was no longer disabling.5 The Appellate Division affirmed
1. See Ponte v. Malina Co., 745 A.2d 127, 130 (R.I 2000).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
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this decree and employee's petition for certiorari was denied by the
supreme court. 6
In 1989, employee filed two subsequent petitions. In the first
petition (WCC 2), employee alleged a recurrence of her incapacity
arising from her original injury.7 In the second petition (WCC 3),
employee alleged the same recurrence of incapacity, and addition-
ally requested that the MOA be amended to include a neck injury
as part of the original injury.8 However, WCC 3 was voluntarily
withdrawn by the employee's counsel at trial.9 WCC 2 was heard
on the merits in the Workers' Compensation Court and after a re-
view of the medical evidence, which primarily addressed com-
plaints about the alleged neck injury, the trial judge found no
recurrence of incapacity. Employee's petition was therefore denied,
and she did not appeal.10
In 1993, employee filed a second petition (WCC 4) to amend
the MOA to include her neck injury."' The employer opposed the
petition by arguing that the applicable three-year limitations pe-
riod for filing compensation claims (section 28-35-57)12 barred any
such amendment to the MOA.13 Further, the employer argued
that the doctrine of res judicata barred any amendment since WCC
3 had already addressed this issue.14 The trial judge rejected the
argument of res judicata because WCC 3 had been voluntarily
withdrawn without prejudice and had not been litigated on the
merits. 15 As for the limitations period allowable for an MOA
amendment, the trial court recognized ambiguity in the Workers'
Compensation Act (WCA) and held that section 28-35-5 applied. 16
Consequently, while section 28-35-5 does not specify any time pe-
riod for filing petitions to amend an MOA,17 the trial court applied
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-57 (1956) (2000 Reenactment).
13. See Ponte, 745 A.2d at 130.
14. See id. at 130-31.
15. See id. at 132.
16. See id. at 131; R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-5 (1956) (2000 Reenactment).
17. See id. at 131-32 (citing Viera v. Davol Inc., 392 A.2d 375 (R.I. 1978)).
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a ten-year limitations period by analogy to section 28-35-45.18
This decision was based on the premise that the WCA should be
construed liberally in favor of employees. 19 The trial judge ordered
that the 1986 MOA be amended to add employee's neck injury, but
the order failed to indicate whether employer was therefore re-
sponsible for any compensation payments due to employee based
on this amendment. 20
In 1995 employee filed two more petitions (WCC 5 and WCC 6)
that were later consolidated. 21 In WCC 5, employee alleged that
she suffered yet another return of incapacity, either as of Septem-
ber 7, 1988, and continuing (the day after WCC 1 was decided) or
as of June 13, 1994, and continuing (the day that WCC 4 allowed
the neck injury to be added to the original MOA).22 Despite a
pending appeal by employer regarding the decision allowing
amendment from WCC 4, the trial judge accepted that employee's
neck injury was now properly before her as part of the amended
MOA.23 With regard to the allegations of a recurrence date in
1988, the trial court held that the issue was barred by the doctrine
of res judicata because the court in WCC 2 did in fact evaluate
employee's neck injury on its merits and found no evidence of any
recurrence of any incapacitating injury during that period.24 With
regard to the allegations of a recurrence date in 1994, the trial
judge determined that employee failed to prove by a preponderance
of the evidence her claim of incapacity and that the opinions of em-
ployer's experts were more persuasive and probative than those of
employee's experts.25
In WCC 6 employee contended that the decision in WCC 4 had
ordered her employer, by implication, to pay compensation for the
neck injury that was not in the original MOA. 26 The trial judge
denied this petition, stating that in allowing an amendment to the
MOA, the judge in WCC 4 did not order employer to pay any addi-
18. See Ponte, 745 A.2d at 132; R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-45 (1956) (2000 Reen-
actment) (specifying a ten-year-limitations period for review and modification of
agreements and decrees).
19. See Ponte, 745 A.2d at 132.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See id. at 133.
25. See id.
26. See id.
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tional weekly benefits and did not alter the WCC 2 finding which
discontinued payment as of September 1988.27
A three-judge panel of the WCC's Appellate Division consoli-
dated the appeals of WCC 4-6.28 The panel reversed the trial
judge's finding in WCC 4 that allowed the MOA amendment.29
The panel concluded that an employee must file a petition to
amend an original petition for benefits within the limitation period
of section 28-35-57,30 just as she would for an original petition.31
Consequently, the panel denied and dismissed the petition of WCC
6 to enforce compensation payments under the amended MOA
since the holding in WCC 2 terminated compensation payments
and a petition requesting such relief would not have been timely.32
Lastly, the panel denied and dismissed employee's petition to re-
view the decision in WCC 5, which found no recurrence of injury in
either 1988 or 1994.3 3 The panel held that res judicata was prop-
erly applied to the 1988 recurrence claim and that the trial judge
properly used her discretion in finding employer's medical experts
more persuasive in the 1994 claim. 34
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court's review of an Appellate Di-
vision's decree is a limited one.35 The supreme court determines
whether that tribunal erred in deciding questions of law. Addition-
ally, if legally competent evidence exists in support of factual find-
ings by the Workers' Compensation Court Appellate Division, such
findings are binding upon the supreme court. 36 Cognizant of this
standard of review, the supreme court analyzed both the limitation
periods applicable to amending and asserting MOA's, and em-
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-57 (1956) (2000 Reenactment). This statute
bars a claim for compensation unless payment of weekly compensation has com-
menced or a petition has been filed within three (3) years after the occurrence of
the injury or incapacity. The lower court in WCC 4 had rejected this statute as
applicable to employee's amendment. See id.
31. See Ponte, 745 A.2d at 133.
32. See id.
33. See id. at 134.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
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ployer liability upon allegations of a return of incapacity.37 These
issues emerged over the course of WCC 1-6. Ultimately, the em-
ployee's petition was granted in part and denied in part.
The supreme court agreed with employee that her WCC 4 peti-
tion to amend the MOA to include her neck injury was improperly
denied and dismissed by the Appellate Division panel.38 Consis-
tent with prior Rhode Island case law, section 28-35-4539 does not
apply to a case of a separate, additional injury arising from one
incident, rather it is limited to injuries that "flow-from" the origi-
nal injury.40 Therefore, the ten-year limitation relied upon by the
trial court in WCC 4 and based upon section 28-35-45 was deemed
inapplicable. 41 The supreme court held (as did also the court in
WCC 4) that it is section 28-35-542 that applies to an employee
whose MOA fails to set out correctly all the injuries received and
that the WCC shall hear such petitions.43 The updated version of
this statute no longer strictly limits petitions to those alleging in-
complete diagnoses and does not explicitly set a limitation pe-
riod.44 Consistent with the WCC 4 decision, the supreme court
recognized the need to liberally construe legislation in order to im-
plement the legislative goal of providing some degree of economic
help to an injured worker because of a loss of earnings. 45 It there-
fore construed section 28-35-5 literally and held that an employee
may petition to amend an MOA without any limitations period if
the purpose of such a petition is merely to include in the MOA an-
other part of the body that was injured at the same time as the
injuries already specified. 46
The supreme court next addressed the issue of entitlement to
compensation once an MOA is amended.47 It held that entitlement
to compensation for such an omitted original injury depends on the
37. See id. at 134-39.
38. See Ponte, 745 A.2d at 134.
39. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-45 (1956) (2000 Reenactment).
40. See Ponte, 745 A.2d at 135 (citing Coletta v. Leviton Mfg. Co., 437 A.2d
1380 (R.I. 1981) and Leviton Mfg. Co. v. Lillibridge, 387 A.2d 1034 (R.L 1978)).
41. See Ponte, 745 A.2d at 135.
42. R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-5 (1956) (2000 Reenactment).
43. See Ponte, 745 A.2d at 134.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 136 (citing Church v. Doherty, 267 A.2d 693, 695 (1970)).
46. See id.
47. See id.
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type and timing of the claim.48 Once an MOA is amended for a
reason set forth in section 28-35-5, an employee may be awarded
compensation benefits retroactively (or to some later date, if the
MOA is still in effect) based upon the later-included injury only if
three conditions are met.49 The claim must not be precluded be-
cause of res judicata or collateral estoppel, the employee must
prove by a preponderance of the credible evidence that she is inca-
pacitated based upon the injury at issue, and the retroactive com-
pensation claim must be filed as set forth in section 28-35-57.50
Such a claim is analogous to the filing of an additional original
petition.51 If an employee seeks benefits from an amended MOA,
looking only forward from a date of recurrence, and not retroac-
tively, section 28-35-45 applies. 52 In such a case, a ten-year limita-
tions period applies and any claim made thereafter is barred. 53
The supreme court emphasized that the purpose of requiring
claims to be brought within a limitations period is to protect the
employer from stale claims too old to be properly investigated or
defended.54
In light of the supreme court's determinations of MOA amend-
ments and limitations periods, the court rejected employee's con-
tention that employer violated a WCC order to pay compensation
to her after the decision in WCC 4 ordered the MOA to be
amended. 55 An allowance for amendment cannot be equated with
an order for payment. 56 The supreme court agreed with the appel-
late panel that the decision in WCC 1 terminated any benefit pay-
ments as of September 1988.5 7 Additionally, both the trial court
and the panel were correct in finding per WCC 5 that the doctrine
of res judicata applied to employee's petition alleging a recurrence
of incapacity because of her neck injury as of September 1988.58
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See id.; R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-35-57 (1956) (2000 Reenactment). Unlike
§ 28-35-5, this statute provides for a limitations period of three (3) years for a ret-
roactive claim of workers' compensation benefits.
51. See Ponte, 745 A.2d at 137.
52. See id. at 136.
53. See id.
54. See Ponte, 745 A.2d at 137.
55. See id.
56. See id.
57. See id.
58. See id. at 138.
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The supreme court looked to whether there was an identified issue,
the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment, and the same
parties, or those in privity with the parties, were involved.59 Also,
the court looked to whether the issue of fact was raised and de-
cided in the prior case.60 When WCC 2 was presented and em-
ployee was denied a finding of a recurrence of injury, the judge
evaluated the medical evidence of employee's neck complaints on
its merits and the issue was litigated and decided upon in full.61
Lastly, the employee in this case was rightfully denied a find-
ing of a return of incapacity in the time periods covered in WCCs 1,
2 and 5.62 When WCC trial judges are presented with conflicting
medical opinions, they are entitled to give greater weight to one
expert over the other.63 As long as the opinion relied upon is com-
petent, the trial judge's choice should be left alone.64 The panel
properly declined to find the trial judge's decision clearly errone-
ous, since the trial judge chose to believe the conclusion by a medi-
cal expert that employee's injuries were consistent with
preexisting arthritis and not work-related injuries. 65
CONCLUSION
In Ponte v. Malina Co., the Rhode Island Supreme Court clari-
fied the allowable limitations periods for an employee injured on
the job to amend the injuries listed in an original MOA and to seek
additional workers' compensation benefits based upon that amend-
ment. When seeking to amend an original MOA to add an addi-
tional body part to the description of the work-related incident,
there is no statutory limitation to when this amendment must be
made. If seeking retroactive benefits from the date of the amended
MOA, there is a statutory limitations period of three years to file
such petition.
Additionally, retroactive benefits may be granted only if the
issue is not precluded by res judicata or collateral estoppel, and if
the claimant proves by a fair preponderance of the credible evi-
59. See id. (citing Lavoie v. Victor Elec., 732 A.2d 52, 54 (R.I. 1999)).
60. See Ponte, 745 A.2d at 138 (citing Di Vona v. Haverill Shoe Novelty Co.,
127 A.2d 503, 505 (R.I. 1956)).
61. See Ponte, 745 A.2d at 138.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id. at 139.
65. See id.
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dence that he is incapacitated. If an employee merely seeks addi-
tional benefits from the date of a recurrence of an injury, whether
based on an injury described in the original MOA or one later ad-
ded by amendment, a ten-year limitations period applies. These
determinations are made in keeping with a public policy balance
between the need for injured employees to receive compensation
for injuries received at work and the need for employers to be pro-
tected from stale claims too old to be properly defended or ade-
quately investigated.
Christy Hetherington
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Workers' Compensation Law. Star Enterprises v. DelBarone,
746 A.2d 692 (R.I. 2000). Because employer proceeded with its pe-
tition to review before the trial judge on a purely abstract basis,
the trial judge did not err in declining to establish earnings capac-
ity based solely on medical functional impairment.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
In Star Enterprises v. DelBarone,' Dennis DelBarone
(DelBarone) injured his neck loading a truck owned by his em-
ployer, Star Enterprises (Star).2 DelBarone was incapacitated due
to this injury, which occurred on October 16, 1995.3 In March
1996, DelBarone's physician advised him that he could return to
work on a light-duty basis.4 DelBarone's physician and Star's con-
sultant surgeon agreed that DelBarone would not be able to return
to his former job, but that he would be capable of light-duty work.5
The parties stipulated that Star was entitled to reduce
DelBarone's benefits to seventy percent of the weekly compensa-
tion rate.6 However, Star also argued that it was entitled to a fur-
ther reduction of benefits under the provisions of section 28-33-
18(c) of the Rhode Island General Laws, which deals with earnings
capacity. 7 The Rhode Island Worker's Compensation Court (WCC)
judge disagreed and denied the request to set an earnings capac-
ity." The WCC appellate division affirmed.9 Star seeks review of
this decision. 10
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
Star argues that the WCC appellate division erred in its inter-
pretation of section 28-33-18(c)." I Star argues that this statute
mandates that an earning capacity for a functional impairment
1. 746 A.2d 692 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id. at 694.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. See id. at 693.
7. See id.
8. See id. 693-94.
9. See id. at 694.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 695.
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must be calculated so as to reduce weekly benefits paid. 12 The su-
preme court disagreed and stated that an earnings capacity may
be set in many different ways, not just based on functional impair-
ment. 13 The court stated that the phrase "and/or" used in the stat-
ute accords a court the discretion to apply one term or the other, or
both.14 Therefore, the court held that a judge can look at func-
tional impairment or an employee's actual disability or both in es-
tablishing an employee's compensation.' 5
Star also argued that the burden is on the employee to demon-
strate a relationship between the functional impairment rating
and the actual disability.' 6 Star alleges that DelBarone failed to
meet his burden because he did not present evidence regarding the
degree of his disability as it relates to his employment. 17 The su-
preme court held that because Star proceeded with its petition to
review before the trial judge on a purely abstract basis, the trial
judge did not err in declining to establish earnings capacity based
solely on medical functional impairment.' 8 However, were this pe-
tition before the court on any other basis, the court held that the
employer would have the burden of showing a correspondence be-
tween the functional impairment and the actual disability, mea-
sured by the ability to earn. 19
CONCLUSION
In Star Enterprises v DelBarone, The Rhode Island Supreme
Court affirmed the Rhode Island Worker's Compensation Court
Appellate Division's denial of a request to set an earning capacity.
Because Star proceeded with its petition to review before the trial
judge on a purely abstract basis, the trial judge did not err in de-
clining to establish earnings capacity based solely on medical func-
tional impairment.
Sheila M. Lombardi
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 696.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id.
18. See id. at 697.
19. See id.
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